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Abstract
Recent scholarship onAvicenna andAvicennismhas tended to focus on the spread and
dissemination of his ideas in the early centuries. However, the later readings and con-
testations of Avicennismespecially from the Safavid period onwards have beenbroadly
neglected. In this paper on themost important philosopher of eighteenth-century Iran,
Mahdī Narāqī, I provide a case study of the enduring significance of Avicennism, but
one which has been transformed by Mullā Ṣadrā’s critical reading of Avicenna. Narāqī
demonstrates howAvicenna had been transformed and how themetaphysical debates
between Avicennism and Mullā Ṣadrā had led to new synthetical positions.
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A somewhat cursory intellectual history of Islamic philosophical traditions
that focuses on the hegemonic authority of schools might yield the follow-
ing threefold periodisation. The first would be an early ‘golden age’ beginning
with the translationmovement and the engagement with Neoplatonising Aris-
totelianism, critiquing but building upon the tradition of the commentators
on Aristotle and on Plotinus, culminating in Avicenna.1 This would be fol-
1 Ulrich Rudolph et al (eds.), Philosophy in the IslamicWorld, Vol. 1 8th–10th Centuries, (Leiden:
Brill, 2016).
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lowed by an age of the ‘pandémie avicennienne,’ both the perpetuation and
development of the Avicennian tradition starting with the first generation of
his student Bahmanyār (d. 458/1067) and consolidating with the appropria-
tion of Avicennism by the kalām tradition and the articulation of the thought
of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), as well as the critiques of Avicenna by
Shahrastānī (d. 528/1153), from an Ismaili apophatic perspective, Suhrawardī
(d. 587/1191) from amore Platonic perspective, and Averroes (d. 595/1198) from
a more ‘orthodox’ Aristotelianism.2 The final stage (before the modern eclipse
of ‘traditional’ philosophy in the Islamicworld) would thus be the replacement
of Avicenna with Mullā Ṣadrā Šīrāzī (d. 1045/1636) as the dominant philoso-
pher of the Islamic traditions from the Safavid period, spreading even to the
Ottoman and Indian contexts.3 Of course, it is entirely possible for each period
to have differing and rival conceptions of philosophy debating among them-
selves. My concern in this paper is to nuance this third period and consider the
perpetuation and transformation of the differing modes of Avicennism. The
contention is that Mahdī Narāqī’s espousal of Avicenna and critical engage-
ment withMullā Ṣadrā signalled less a doctrinaire espousal of Avicennism and
more a promotion of a highly transformed Avicennism that was already influ-
enced by a Sadrian reading of the work of the master.
Considered from the perspective of contemporary Islamic philosophy in
Iran, it seems that the thought of Mullā Ṣadrā Šīrāzī (d. 1045/1636) is dom-
inant. The plethora of comparative studies in which Mullā Ṣadrā represents
Islamic philosophy as a dominant, triumphal figure, with any number of mod-
ern European thinkers seems to suggest as much.4 Mullā Ṣadrā is championed
as the Kant of Iran, and like Thomas Aquinas in the Catholic tradition is analyt-
icised, made more continental, is exegetically glossed, and is read for different
purposes in identity politics.5 Similarly, an examination of philosophical tradi-
2 Jean R. Michot, “La pandémie avicennienne au Vie/XIIe siècle,” Arabica, 10.3 (1993): 287–
344; Ahmed al-Rahim, The Creation of Philosophical Tradition: Biography and the Reception of
Avicenna’s Philosophy from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth Century AD (Wiesbaden: Otto Har-
rassowitz, 2018).
3 Henry Corbin, La philosophie iranienne islamique aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris: Buchet
Chastel, 1981); Christian Jambet, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie islamique? (Paris: Gallimard,
2011); SeyyedHosseinNasr andMehdiAminrazavi (eds.), AnAnthologyof Philosophy inPersia,
Vol. 5: From the School of Shiraz to the Twentieth Century (London: Tauris, 2015), esp. 119–528.
4 For example, Muḥammad Fanāʾī Aškivarī, Maʿqūl-i ṯānī: taḥlīlī az anwāʿ-yi mafāhīm-i kullī
dar falsafa-yi islāmī va ġarbī (Qum: Intišārāt-i muʾassasa-yi āmūzīš va pažhūhišī-yi Imām
Ḫumaynī, 1387 Š/2008); Alparslan Açikgenç, Being and Existence in Sadra and Heidegger: A
Comparative Ontology (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1993).
5 SajjadH. Rizvi,Mullā ṢadrāandMetaphysics:Modulation of Being (London: Routledge, 2009),
4–14. On the reception of Kant, see Roman Seidel, Kant inTeheran: Anfänge, Ansätze undKon-
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tions in the Qajar period demonstrates the first stage of his dominance when
it was the study of his texts that displaced Avicenna from the core of the cur-
riculum.6 However, it took some time for the hegemony of the Šīrāzī thinker to
become established and his work and key ideas were contested from a number
of perspectives; for example, his views on the possibility, indeed the necessity
for motion (and quantity and quality) to pertain to the category of substance
(ḥaraka ǧawharīya, against Avicenna) which was an important corollary of his
theory of the ontological priority of existence (aṣālat al-wuǧūd) and its mod-
ulation (taškīk), were widely disputed.7 In this paper, I will examine an impor-
tant episode of Avicennian engagement with the thought of Mullā Ṣadrā, as
expressed in the work of the eighteenth-century thinker Mahdī b. Abī Dharr
Narāqī (d. 1209/1795) as an Avicennian philosopher inspired by Mullā Ṣadrā’s
reading of Avicenna but also critical of his more mystical intuitions about
ontology. But first let us begin with the consideration of the Avicennian tra-
dition in the Safavid period and the earliest such responses to Mullā Ṣadrā to
make sense of the Avicennisms that Narāqī inherited.
1 Disputing Avicenna in the Safavid Period
These disputations began in the immediate generation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s stu-
dents including ʿAbd al-Razzāq Lāhīǧī (d. 1072/1661) who, on the basis of a
defence of Avicennism, rejected the two key elements of Ṣadrian ontology in
his work.8 But in particular, it was the ‘school’ of Raǧab ʿAlī Tabrīzī (d. 1080/
texte derKantrezeption in Iran (Berlin:Walter deGruyter, 2014). There are plenty of works that
pit Mullā Ṣadrā against Kant. See the works of Murtażā Muṭahharī, such as his four volume
commentary on the text of Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī (d. 1298/1873), Šarḥ-i mabsūṭ-i manẓūma
(Tehran: Intišārāt-i Ḥikmat, 1363 Š/1985), and his notes on the lectures of ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī
published in five volumes as Uṣūl-i falsafa va-raviš-i riʾālizm (Qum: Intišārāt-i Ṣadrā, 1382
Š/2003). Muṭahharī and Ṭabāṭabāʾī are known for their deployment of Mullā Ṣadrā against
modern European philosophy—see Urs Gösken, Kritik der westlichen Philosophie in Iran.
ZumgeistesgeschichtlichenSelbstverständnis vonMuḥammadḤusaynṬabāṭabāʾī undMurtażā
Muṭahharī (Munich: Walter de Gruyter, 2014).
6 Sajjad H. Rizvi, “Ḥikmamutaʿāliya in Qajar Iran: Locating theWork of Mulla Hadi Sabzawari,”
Iranian Studies, 44.4 (2011): 473–96; and idem, “ʿAlī Nūrī,” in Philosophy in Qajar Iran, ed. by
Reza Pourjavady (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 125–78, as well as the other contributions in the same
volume.
7 ʿAlī-Riżā Ẕakāvatī Qarāġuzlū, “Sayrī dar naqd-i afkār-i Mullā Ṣadrā dar čahār qarn-i aḫīr,”
Āyīna-yi pažūhiš 10.57 (1378 Š/1999): 14–21.
8 ʿAbdal-RazzāqLāhīǧī,Gawhar-imurād, ed. byZaynal-ʿĀbidīnQurbānī Lāhīǧī (Tehran:Daftar-
i tablīġāt-i islāmī, 1388 Š/2009), 192–6; idem, Šawāriq al-ilhām fī šarḥ Taǧrīd al-kalām, ed. by
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1669) which rejected the Ṣadrian theory of existence often on the grounds
that there could be no analogy between Creator and created—they preferred
a more apophatic approach to philosophy as one can see in Tabrīzī’s two main
texts on the nature of God, Proof of the Necessary (Iṯbāt-i vāǧib) and the Funda-
mental Principle (Aṣl al-aṣīl).9 In the latter text, Tabrīzī posits four objections.
First, he rejected the analogy between the term ‘existence’ posited for the con-
tingent and for the necessary based on the Arabic Neoplatonic axiom ex uno
non fit nisi unum.10 Second, he critiqued the ontological priority of existence
by arguing that quiddities are instantiated without existence, and hence they
are ‘made’ (maǧʿūla) by God directly without any need for existence.11 This
broadly follows the position of Ǧalāl al-DīnDawānī (d. 908/1502) onmaǧʿūlīyat
al-māhīya, although Tabrīzī does not invoke his authority.12 Third, he rejected
Akbar Asad ʿAlī-zāda (Qum: Muʾassasa-yi Imām Ṣādiq, 1391 Š/2012), I, 143–60, 221–4, III,
171–180; idem, al-Kalima al-ṭayyiba, ed. by Ḥamīd ʿAṭāʾī Naẓarī (Tehran:Muʾassasa-yi pažū-
hišī-yi ḥikmat va falsafa-yi Īrān, 1391 Š/2012), 130–2, 133–6; Corbin, La philosophie iranienne
islamique, 103–9.
9 Raǧab ʿAlī Tabrīzī, Iṯbāt-i vāǧib, in Muntaḫabātī az āṯār-i ḥukamāʾ-yi ilāhī-yi Īrān, ed. by
Sayyid Ǧalāl al-Dīn Āštiyānī (Qum: Daftar-i tablīġāt-i islāmī, 1378 Š/1999), I, 239–58; Raǧab
ʿAlī Tabrīzī, Aṣl al-aṣīl, ed. by ʿAzīz Ǧavānpūr Hiravī and Ḥasan Akbar Bayraq (Tehran:
Anǧuman-i mafāḫir va āṯār-i farhangī, 1386 Š/2007); Nasr and Aminrazavi (eds.), An
Anthology of Philosophy in Persia, 285–304; Corbin, Laphilosophie iranienne islamique, 83–
95.
10 Tabrīzī, Aṣl al-aṣīl, 26–9. The axiom is best known through Avicenna, The Metaphysics of
the Healing, ed. and tr. by Michael Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press,
2005), book IX, chapter 4, 328; and al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt maʿ šarḥay, ed. by Maḥmūd
Šihābī (Qum: Našr al-balāġa, 1375 Š/1996), III, 122; and his student Bahmanyār, Kitāb al-
taḥṣīl, ed. by Murtaḍā Muṭahharī (Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1375 Š/1996), 531–2.
Cristina d’Ancona has suggested that the roots of the axiom lie in the Arabic Plotinus
and Proclus—see “Ex uno non fit nisi unum Storia e preistoria della dottrina avicenniana
della prima intelligenzia,” in Per una storia del concetto di mente, ed. by Eugenio Canone
(Firenze: L.S. Oschki, 2007), 29–55. There are other earlier echoes, for example in the pos-
sibly apocryphal Fārābian commentary on the ‘so-called treatise of Zeno:’ Šarḥ risālat
Zīnūn, ed. by Ḥāmid Nāǧi Iṣfahānī, in Ganǧina-yi Bahāristān Ḥikmat II, ed. by ʿAlī Awǧabī
(Tehran: Kitābḫāna, mūza va markaz-i asnād-i Maǧlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī, 1387 Š/2008), 128.
For a study that questions the attribution of this text to Fārābī, see Josep Puig, “Un tratado
de Zenón el Mayor. Un comentaria atribuido a al-Farabi,” La Ciudad de Dios 201 (1988):
287–321.
11 Tabrīzī, Aṣl al-aṣīl, 55–60, 68–9.
12 Reza Pourjavady, “Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502), Glosses on ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Qūshjī’s
Commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād,” The Oxford Handbook of Islamic
Philosophy, ed. by Khaled el-Rouayheb and Sabine Schmidtke (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2017), 415–37, esp. 422–3, 428–9; Ġulām-Ḥusayn Ibrāhīmī Dīnānī, Ǧalāl al-
Dīn Davānī: fīlsūf-i ḏawq al-taʾalluh (Tehran: Intišārāt-i Hirmis, 1395 Š/2016), 18–20, 59–
90.
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the Ṣadrianpositionof motion in the category of substance. Fourth, hedenied a
mental mode of existence (wuǧūd ḏihnī)—an issue that was broadly accepted
in the Avicennian tradition stemming from Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274).13
However, he did accept the Ṣadrianposition on the infallibility of knowledge by
presence.14 Dawānī’s positions were broadly eclipsed from the Iranian milieu
in this period, whichmay account forwhy the tendency associatedwithTabrīzī
did not survive.15 In this sense, the Essence of Philosophy (ʿAyn al-ḥikma) of Mīr
Qawām al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Ṭihrānī (d. 1093/1683), despite being more philosoph-
ically sophisticated and Avicennian than that of his teacher Tabrīzī, was the
last gasp of the school that rejected Ṣadrian innovations in metaphysics and
insisted upon the radical ontological and semantic distinction between God
and the cosmos.16 The exception were the Ḫwānsārīs in the seventeenth cen-
tury whose positions on existence were reminiscent of Dawānī. It was thus left
to the mainstream Avicennian tradition to adapt to Sadrian positions and to
retain a critical attitude.
Therefore, most of the critiques of the metaphysics of Mullā Ṣadrā came
from the mainstream Avicennian tradition in their commentary cultures on
the Cure (al-Šifāʾ) and Pointers and Reminders (al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt), and via
the commentary tradition on the pithy kalām text Sublimation of Belief (Taǧrīd
al-iʿtiqād) of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, and its two commentaries, the ‘old’ by Šams
al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī (d. 749/1348) and the ‘new’ by ʿAlī al-Qūšǧī (d. 879/1474). That
‘orthodox Avicennian’ tradition was unhappy with the Ṣadrian shift towards
a more thoroughly neoplatonising and mysticising approach to philosophy,
moves which were arguably part of the Safavid mainstream through its em-
brace of the pseudo-Aristotelian Theologia Aristotelis and works attributed to
al-Fārābī (d. 339/951) associated with the dossier of Plotinus, Proclus and oth-
ers in Arabic Neoplatonism.17 The Safavid period was one attuned to the con-
scious revival of classical heritages, Hellenic and Šīʿī, the former because all
13 Tabrīzī, Aṣl al-aṣīl, 60–6.
14 Tabrīzī, Aṣl al-aṣīl, 86–9.
15 Pourjavady, “Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502),” 433–5; contra Robert Wisnovsky, “Avi-
cenna’s Islamic reception,” in Interpreting Avicenna, ed. by Peter Adamson (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 190–213, esp. 209.
16 Mīr Qawām al-Dīn al-Ṭihrānī Rāzī, ʿAyn al-ḥikma wa-taʿlīqāt, ed. by ʿAlī Awǧabī (Tehran:
Intišārāt-i kitābḫāna, mūza va markaz-i asnād-i Maǧlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī, 1378 Š/1999); Cor-
bin, La philosophie iranienne islamique, 206–18. His contemporary did much the same—
see ʿAlī-qulī b. Qaraǧġāy Ḫān, Iḥyāʾ-yi ḥikmat, ed. by Fāṭima Fanā, 2 vols. (Tehran: Mīrāṯ-i
maktūb, 1377 Š/1998).
17 Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke, “An Eastern Renaissance? Greek Philosophy
under the Safavids,” Intellectual History of the IslamicateWorld, 3 (2015): 248–90.
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philosophy was ultimately a prophetic revelation and inheritance and the lat-
ter because it was the direct legacy of prophecy.
Thus far, as El-Rouayheb observed, we have tended to ignore the critics of
Mullā Ṣadrā, especially from the Avicennian tradition, in the intellectual his-
tory of the early modern Islamicate East.18 Therefore, we need to re-examine
that tradition especially in light of the challenge of Mullā Ṣadrā. He fundamen-
tally undermined Avicenna and Avicennism in a number of ways: he displaced
Avicennian substance metaphysics and its hylemorphism with a more process
oriented metaphysics of existence in which category theory became redun-
dant; he shifted epistemology away from the binarism of what the external
and internal senses perceive and the distinction within intellection between
abstraction from sense data and reception of the universals from the transcen-
dental active intellect towards a more monistic reading of knowledge as states
of existence and faculties of the soul; and he set aside the Avicennian compro-
mise on the spiritual resurrection of the person sitting alongside the scriptural
account of corporeal resurrection with his own hybrid theory of the body of
the afterlife being ‘created’ by the human soul as instrument of the divine. His
ideas and method were radically different, even when located in Avicennian
paradigms and questions.
As Wisnovsky has shown, Mullā Ṣadrā inherited a reading of Avicenna’s
Metaphysics of al-Šifāʾ and al-Išārātwa-l-tanbīhāt that wasmediated in the first
case by the Šīʿī tradition of ʿAllāma Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 725/1325) and
the Safavid thinkers and in the latter case by the dual heritage of Naṣīr al-Dīn
al-Ṭūsī and his influential commentary Resolving the Difficulties in the Pointers
(Ḥallmuškilāt al-išārāt) and Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) and hismore crit-
ical adoption of Avicenna in his own commentary on Pointers and his other
works.19 In fact, it was the impact of the latter upon the kalām traditions, both
Sunnī and Šīʿī that defined Avicennism in the early modern period.20 For the
18 Khaled El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Cur-
rents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2015), 361.
19 Robert Wisnovsky, “Avicennism and Early Exegetical Practice in the Commentaries on
the Ishārāt,” Oriens 41 (2013): 349–78; idem, “Avicenna’s Islamic reception;” Jon McGinnis,
“Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) Sharḥ al-ishārāt,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philos-
ophy, ed. by el-Rouayheb and Schmidtke, 326–47; Ayman Shihadeh, “Al-Rāzī’s (d. 1210)
Commentary on Avicenna’s Pointers,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy, ed.
by el-Rouayheb and Schmidtke, 296–325.
20 RobertWisnovsky, “OneAspect of theAvicennianTurn in SunnīTheology,”Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 14 (2004): 65–100; Heidrun Eichner,The Post-Avicennian Philosophical Tra-
dition and Islamic Orthodoxy: Philosophical and Theological Summae in Context, Habilita-
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later tradition in the East, al-Ṭūsī is a pivotal figure since it was his twin contri-
bution to the reading of Avicenna’s metaphysics—the postulation of a mode
of existence called the mental (ḏihnī) and that existence is said of in many
ways in a graded or modulated manner (taškīk al-wuǧūd)—that was taken up
in the language of ontology.21 However, it was Mullā Ṣadrā who transferred
these key notions into commitments to a particular vision of reality—themod-
ulated singularity of existence (ḥaqīqa wāḥida mušakkaka) was not just about
the semantics of the term ‘existence’ but constituted a description of an actual
metaphysics.22 The Pointers traditionwas then filtered down through the ‘adju-
dication’ (muḥākama) of al-Ṭūsī’s student Quṭb al-Dīn Taḥtānī (d. 766/1365),
favouring his teacher, followed by the influential glosses of Mīrzāǧān Bāġnawī
(d. 994/1585). The other important strand of the Avicennian tradition came
through theTaǧrīdof al-Ṭūsī and theGlossesof al-Šarīf ʿAlī Ǧurǧānī (d. 816/1414)
on the ‘old’ commentary of Šams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī, the two Glosses of Ṣadr al-
Dīn Daštakī (d. 903/1497) and the three of Ǧalāl al-Dīn Dawānī (d. 908/1502)
in response on the ‘new’ commentary by Qūšǧī, and then the Glosses of Šams
al-Dīn Ḫafrī (d. 957/1550) on the proof for the existence of God section (al-
maqṣad al-ṯāliṯ fī iṯbāt al-ṣāniʿ) of the ‘new’ commentary.23 Ḫafrī was an influ-
ential confluence of the two strands because he also wrote a set of glosses
on Taḥtānī’s adjudication on Pointers.24 These internal debates in Šīrāz were
particularly vehement on the first section of the Taǧrīd on the ontology (espe-
cially whether God could be characterised by ‘absolute existence’ or wuǧūd
muṭlaq) andon the third sectionon thedivine attributes.We see glimpses of the
Daštakī-Dawānī debates in thework of Mullā Ṣadrā himself, but certainly in the
many subsequentmarginalia of the later Safavid period on twoGlosses: Glosses
on Dawānī’s ‘older’ Gloss (ḥāšiya qadīma) starting with the generation of the
students of Dawānī all the way through to the post-Safavid period, broadly
tionsschrift, Halle, 2009; eadem, “Handbooks in the Tradition of Later Eastern Ashʿarism,”
inTheOxfordHandbookof IslamicTheology, ed. by Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford:OxfordUni-
versity Press, 2016), 494–514.
21 Ṭūsī did not invent these concepts in the Avicennian tradition; however, he emphasised
their centrality to readingAvicennianmetaphysics—seeAvicenna,al-Išārātwa-l-tanbīhāt
maʿ šarḥay, III, 6–7, 17–8.
22 Wahid Amin, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and the Avicennan Tradition: Metaphysics andMental Exis-
tence, D.Phil. dissertation, Oxford, 2016.
23 Šams al-Dīn Muḥammad Ḫafrī, Taʿlīqa bar Ilāhīyāt-i šarḥ-i Taǧrīd-i Mullā ʿAlī Qūšǧī, ed. by
Firūza Sāʿatčīyān (Tehran: Mīrāṯ-i maktūb, 1382 Š/2003).
24 Šams al-Dīn Muḥammad Ḫafrī, Ḥāšiya al-muḥākama bayn šarḥay al-išārāt, ed. by ʿAbd
Allāh Nūrānī in Ganǧīna-yi Bahāristān: Ḥikmat I, ed. by ʿAlī Awǧabī (Tehran: Intišārāt-i
kitābḫāna, mūza va markaz-i asnād-i Maǧlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī, 1379 Š/2000), 137–99.
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divided into those who defended Dawānī’s positions (earlier and then mov-
ing beyond Iran) and those who criticised or went further (especially later and
among those who remained in Iran), and Glosses on Ḫafrī throughout the sev-
enteenth century between students of Mīr Dāmād and Mullā Ṣadrā, including
those who perpetuated the Dawānī-Daštakī debates. Often commentaries and
independent treatises on the same topic cluster around one another as texts
are creatures of conversations. Before one can have a fuller intellectual history
of the reception of Avicennism through kalām commentaries, one would have
to study these texts that on the whole are extant in multiple copies.
The Avicennian tradition in the Safavid period could not ignore the impact
of Mullā Ṣadrā’s glosses on al-Šifāʾ. Most of the Avicennian works in the period
before were focused on the commentary cycles of al-Išārāt and the Taǧrīd.
The revived interest in the Metaphysics of al-Šifāʾ of Avicenna began in Šīrāz
with Cure for the Hearts (Šifāʾ al-qulūb) of Ġiyāṯ al-Dīn Daštakī (d. 949/1542),
who devoted most of his glosses to the definition of philosophy and ontol-
ogy of book 1 (he wrote a larger set of glosses entitled Gardens of pleasure
[Riyāḍ al-riḍwān] prior to Šifāʾ but it does not seem to be extant),25 and ran
on through the glosses of Mīrzāǧān Bāġnawī Šīrāzī, a student of the philoso-
phers of Shiraz,MīrDāmād (d. 1040/1631), andhis student SayyidAḥmad ʿAlawī
(d. c. 1060/1650); in fact it would not be an exaggeration to say that Mīr Dāmād
and his students, taking on the mantle of the Daštakīs, defined the Avicennian
tradition for the period.26 The popularity of both the Metaphysics of al-Šifāʾ
and al-Išārāt is well attested in the sources that mention many teachers of
these texts and marginalia and commentaries. There were even translations
into Persian of these texts by Sayyid ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-ʿUrayḍī al-Imāmī
(d. 1120/1708) who had studied with Ḥusayn Ḫwānsārī.27
25 Ġiyāṯ al-Dīn Manṣūr Daštakī, Muṣannafāt, ed. by ʿAbdullāh Nūrānī (Tehran: Anǧuman-i
mafāḫir va āṯār-i farhangī, 1386 Š/2007), II, 377; idem, Šifāʾ al-qulūbwa-taǧawhar al-aǧsām,
ed. by ʿAlī Awǧabī (Tehran: Intišārāt-i kitābḫāna, mūza va markaz-i asnād-i Maǧlis-i Šūrā-
yi Islāmī, 1390 Š/2011); ĀqāBuzurgṬihrānī, al-Ḏarīʿa ilā taṣānīf al-Šīʿa (Beirut: Dār al-aḍwāʾ,
1983), XI, 325.
26 Daštakī, Muṣannafāt, II, 377–490; Ibn Sīnā, al-Šifāʾ (al-ilāhīyāt): maʿ taʿlīqāt Ṣadr al-mu-
taʾallihīn,Mīr Dāmād, al-ʿAlawī, al-Ḫwānsārī, al-Sabzawārī, Mullā Sulaymān,Mullā Awliyāʾ
wa-ġayrihim, ed. by Ḥāmid Nāǧī Iṣfahānī (Tehran: Anǧuman-i mafāḫir va āṯār-i farhangī,
1383 Š/2004); Ahab Bdaiwi, Shiʿi Defenders of Avicenna: An Intellectual History of the Dash-
takī Philosophers of Shiraz, Ph.D. dissertation, Exeter, 2014; RobertWisnovsky, “Avicennism
and Early Exegetical Practice.” This is not to deny the influence of Dawānī onMīr Dāmād,
but rather to indicate that the Daštakīs ushered in a ‘Šiʿi Avicennism’ whose leadership
Mīr Dāmād adopted.
27 Sayyid Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī, Talāmiḏat al-ʿAllāma al-Maǧlisī wa-l-muǧāzūn minhu (Qum:
Kitābḫāna-yi Āyatullāh Marʿašī Naǧafī, 1410/1989), 44; Muḥammad Riżā Zādhūš, Dīdār bā
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However, the glosses of Mullā Ṣadrā were well known, extensive, widely at-
tested and posed a challenge.28 Extant in themanuscript libraries of Iran, there
are a number of codices from the seventeenth century including an acephalous
holograph (MSMarʿašī Qumm914).29 His commentary runs to the end of chap-
ter 5 of book 6 of the Metaphysics on causality and providence, hence missing
out the following books on the proof for the existence of God as the necessary
existence, on governance and on eschatology. He also consistently continues
the commentary tradition in the East of al-Išārāt by defending al-Ṭūsī’s reading
and criticizing al-Rāzī’s objections. By contrast, the Key to the Cure (Miftāḥ al-
šifāʾ) of ʿAlawī, an extensive commentary by the son-in-law of Mīr Dāmād, has
seven extant codices from the 17th century including theholograph (MSMaǧlis-
i šūra-yi Islāmī Tehran 1789) but is barely cited in the commentary tradition of
subsequent generations.30 This could also be because he defends Avicennian
positions attacked and rendered irrelevant (insofar as theywere little discussed
afterwards since the debate hadmoved on) byMullā Ṣadrā such as his defence
of Avicennian eschatology from book 10, a minimalist reading of divine sim-
plicity in chapter 4 of book 8, and his defence of Avicenna’s theory of God’s
knowledge of particulars in chapter 6 of book 8, which Mullā Ṣadrā sets aside
for his use of the identity theory of knowledge (within a discussion on knowl-
edge by presence—ʿilm ḥuḍūrī).31 Since he was writing around the same time
as Mullā Ṣadrā, it is also quite likely that he was not aware of his reading or did
not consider it significant enough to engage.
An example of the influence of Mullā Ṣadrā’s glosses can be seen soon after
his death in the glosses on the Metaphysics of al-Šifāʾ by Muḥammad Bāqir
Sabzawārī (d. 1090/1679), a leading court theologian and himself a student of
Ḥusayn Ḫwānsārī, Mīr Abū-l-Qāsim Findiriskī (d. 1050/1641), and of other stu-
dents of Mīr Dāmād, as well as being a leading court jurist under ʿAbbās II.32
fīlsūfān-i Sipāhān (Tehran: Muʾassasa-yi pažūhišī-yi ḥikmat u falsafa-yi Īrān, 1391 Š/2012),
161; Ivana Panzeca, “On the Persian translations of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt,”Documenti e studi
sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 28 (2017): 553–67.
28 Mullā Ṣadrā Šīrāzī, Šarḥ wa taʿlīqāt ʿalā Ilāhīyāt al-Šifāʾ, ed. by Naǧaf-qulī Ḥabībī (Tehran:
Intišārāt-i Bunyād-i ḥikmat-i islāmī-yi Ṣadrā, 1382 Š/2003).
29 Muṣṭafā Dirāyatī (ed.), Fihristvāra-yi dast-nivišt-hā-yi Īrān [Dinā] (Qum: Al-Hādī, 1389
Š/2010), IV, 308–9.
30 Dirāyatī, Fihristvāra, IX, 1037–8.
31 Sayyid Aḥmad al-ʿAlawī, Miftāḥ al-Šifāʾ, in Muntaḫabātī, ed. by Āštiyānī, II, 39–54, 73–
90, 115–43; Mullā Ṣadrā Šīrāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya fī-l-asfār al-ʿaqlīya al-arbaʿa, ed. by
Sayyid Muḥammad Ḫāminihī et al. (Tehran: Intišārāt-i Bunyād-i ḥikmat-i islāmī-yi Ṣadrā,
1383 Š/2004), IX, 199–223, VI, 91–97, VI, 184–217, 251–67, III, 339–47, 481–529.
32 al-Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī, Amal al-āmil fī ʿulamāʾ Ǧabal ʿĀmil, ed. by Sayyid Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī al-
Aškiwarī (Naǧaf: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Ḥaydariyya, 1966), I, 250–2.
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Eight manuscripts are extant of his commentary that runs to book 8 of the
Metaphysics. Sabzawārī consistently cited Mullā Ṣadrā as ‘one of the schol-
ars’ (baʿḍ al-fuḍalāʾ) or ‘chief of the great scholars’ (Ṣadr al-afāḍil). At the
same time, he criticised his brother-in-law and teacher (or at the very least
fellow student of Findiriskī) Ḫwānsārī on a number of points and supported
the positions of Mullā Ṣadrā. On some points he tried to adjudicate between
the two; for example, on whether existence that is the subject of metaphysics
is an abstract concept (‘absolute existence’ or ‘being qua being’), or whether
it primarily refers to substance (ǧawhar) or whether to God as the ultimate
referent for existence, Sabzawārī suggested that the difference between the
two was really a semantic squabble (munāqiša lafẓīya).33 Sabzawārī approv-
ingly quoted Mullā Ṣadrā arguing that metaphysics does not just study sub-
stances but being qua being and secondarily provides the subjects of all the
other sciences, a position that is critiqued by Ḫwānsārī to whom Sabzawārī
responds.34 Most importantly, Sabzawārī considers Ḫwānsārī’s objections to
be misplaced because they seek to defend Avicenna by sticking faithfully to
the text as an exegetical exercise. According to him, Ḫwānsārī fails to appre-
ciate that Mullā Ṣadrā’s glosses are concerned with the philosophical mean-
ing and explanation of the issues that Avicenna discusses and not of Avi-
cenna himself (lā tafsīr ṣarīḥ al-lafẓ).35 Sabzawārī did not study directly with
Mullā Ṣadrā or even with any of his students as far as we know; however,
it is clear through his copious citations of the Šīrāzī thinker that he consid-
ered him to have fundamentally altered the Avicennian tradition—away from
the legacy of Mīr Dāmād—and to have presented a novel and critical way
of reading Avicenna. It was this new reading to which Ḫwānsārī and others
objected.
It might be useful to catalogue the challenge that Mullā Ṣadrā’s reading
posed by considering some of the key issues of dispute with Avicenna in his
major works, the Transcendent Philosophy of the Four Journeys of the Intellect
(al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya fī-l-asfār al-ʿaqlīya al-arbaʿa) completed in 1037/1628,
and his Gloss on the Metaphysics of al-Šifāʾ completed some time between
1041/1631 and 1044/1634, in which he often refers back to the former work.
As such, they are works that represent his mature thought, and it is possible
that the incompleteness of his glosses may be due to the fact that he died in
1045/1636.
33 Mullā Ṣadrā, Šarḥ, I, 23–4; Sabzawārī, Ḥāšiya, in Muntaḫabātī, ed. by Āštiyānī, II, 550–1;
Ḫwānsārī, Ḥāšiya, inMuntaḫabātī, ed. by Āštiyānī, I, 377.
34 Mullā Ṣadrā, Šarḥ, I, 49–50; Ḫwānsārī, Ḥāšiya, I, 378; Sabzawārī, Ḥāšiya, II, 566–7.
35 Sabzawārī, Ḥāšiya, II, 574–5 and 581–2, citing Mullā Ṣadrā, Šarḥ, I, 50.
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There are three broad areas inwhich his positionwas at oddswithAvicenna.
The first concerns the nature of the structure of existence and its modulation.
Whilst allowing for modulation of the concept of existence, Avicenna denies
that modulation pertains to the reality of existence or even is an essential fea-
ture of existence.36 Al-Ṭūsī goes further by allowing for that semantic modula-
tion to cover the intensification and debilitation of existence, andMullā Ṣadrā
cites these three ways in which modulation occurs: by precedence, by priority,
and by intensity (al-awlawīya, al-aqdamīya, al-ašaddīya).37 Mullā Ṣadrā there-
fore critiqued Avicenna for failing to see through the logic of the semantics of
modulation. In his critique of the Avicennian position, he once again stipulates
that “existence is a simple reality and nature that differs in varying degrees of
perfection and imperfection and intensity and debility and priority and poste-
riority, all of which pertain to its very essence. […] It is the principle of realities
and their essence. […] If you have realised this, and your heart has opened to
it and you have practised your reason on this, then many further subjects of
knowledgewill bedisclosed to yourheart.”38Therefore, realising themodulated
nature of existence opens theways for resolvingmany other philosophical apo-
riai.
Second, he took Avicenna (and his followers) to task for failing to under-
stand the nature of the soul and its rational faculty, and in particular for under-
standing that intellection involves a process of union between the intellecting
substance andwhat is intellected.39 He cites the important passages in Pointers
and in the De Anima ( fī l-nafs) of al-Šifāʾ on the denial of the identity thesis.40
Avicenna’s confusion arises from a mistaken conception of the union of the
two as well as espistemological infallibilism. As elsewhere, Mullā Ṣadrā’s inspi-
ration comes from the Neoplatonic Theology of Aristotle.41
Third, his position on the essential nature of motion as a feature of exis-
tence was contrary to Avicenna. The controversy of motion in substance was
recognised early on along with a classic Avicennian criticism that the acci-
dental motion of bodies in this sublunary sphere is an effect of the eternal
36 Ibn Sīnā, al-Šifāʾ: ilāhīyāt, ed. by Ǧ. Anawātī, Saʿīd Zāyid, IbrāhīmMadkūr et al. (Cairo: al-
Hayʾa al-miṣrīya al-ʿāmma li-l-kitāb, 1960), I, 34; Mullā Ṣadrā, Šarḥ, I, 129–31.
37 Ibn Sīnā, al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt maʿ šarḥay, III, 32–4; Mullā Ṣadrā, Šarḥ, I, 129.
38 Mullā Ṣadrā, Šarḥ, I, 499–500.
39 Mullā Ṣadrā, Asfār, III, 339.
40 Mullā Ṣadrā, Asfār, III, 347–51, citing Ibn Sīnā, al-Išārāt, III, 292–296, and Ibn Sīnā, al-Šifāʾ:
fī l-nafs, eds. Ǧ. Anawātī, Saʿīd Zāyid, Ibrāhīm Madkūr et al. (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-miṣrīya al-
ʿāmma li-l-kitāb, 1960), 212–3.
41 Mullā Ṣadrā, Asfār, III, 343, citing (ps.-)Aristotle, Uṯūlūǧiyā, in Aflūṭīn ʿind al-ʿarab, ed. by
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Badawī (Cairo: L’ Institut français, 1947),mīmar VIII, 117.
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motion of the celestial spheres. This is pre-empted along with the affirmation
that motion in the category of substance is an essential feature of the renewal
of natural bodies insofar as they are existent. The very definition of substance
goes beyond Avicenna; substances are not just primary referents of existence
that exist by virtue of themselves and do not exist in any other substrate, but
rather are units of becoming in the hierarchy of contingency that are quali-
fied by the receptivity to change and are constantly in flux.42 Mullā Ṣadrā put
forward at least nine arguments in favour of motion in the category of sub-
stance.43 Three should suffice to demonstrate the critique of Avicenna, since
most of the arguments revert to these. The first and most important relates
to how substance is the subject, ground and cause of change. All accidental
change is predicated on the changing nature of the substance, since it is the
substance that is consistently renewing: “The proximate cause formotionmust
be the ever-renewing existing thing of a fixed essence, and the proximate cause
of every typeof motion canonly benature that is a substance constitutedby the
body and occurrent by a species. […] Therefore it is clear that every body must
be an ever-renewing existence.”44 The point about the ever-renewing nature of
existence is tied to his notion of the constant ‘renewal of creation’ (ḫalq ǧadīd)
that he draws from Ibn ʿArabī.
The second is that all accidental qualities pertain to the individuated sub-
stance that is the referent for the corporeal essence and its changing quali-
ties: “The existence of every corporeal nature is essential to it such that the
substance that is continuous, changing, temporal and locational is so by that
essence. So quantities and colours and places must be changeable by the exis-
tence of the particular individuated corporeal substance and that is motion in
substance.”45 A parallel argument to this is based on the notion of time and its
course.
The third relates to the nature of change and how the graduated nature of
change as opposed to once and for all discrete changes requires the substrate of
that change to be a stable essence of an existent substance in flux, and the ulti-
mate substrate is prime matter.46 Once again he appeals to something beyond
42 Avicenna, The Physics of the Healing, ed. and tr. by Jon McGinnis (Provo, UT: Brigham
Young University Press, 2009), book III, II, 260–1; Mullā Ṣadrā, Asfār, V, 6–10.
43 ʿAbd al-Rasūl ʿUbūdīyat,Dar āmadī bih niẓām-i ḥikmat-i Ṣadrāʾī (Qum:Muʾassasa-yi Imām
Ḫumaynī, 1391 Š/2012), I, 323–7. See Mullā Ṣadrā, Asfār, III, 61–2, 101–2, 104, 177–8, IV, 274,
VII, 290–2, VIII, 11–2, and al-Šawāhid al-rubūbīya fī-l-manāhiǧ al-sulūkīya, ed. by Sayyid
Muṣṭafā Muḥaqqiq Dāmād (Tehran: Bunyād-i ḥikmat-i islāmī-yi Ṣadrā, 1382 Š/2003), 108.
44 Mullā Ṣadrā, Asfār, III, 74–5.
45 Mullā Ṣadrā, Asfār, III, 113.
46 Mullā Ṣadrā, Asfār, IV, 459.
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analytic argument by saying that all those with soundmystical intuition recog-
nise that motionmust pertain to the substrate before it affects the accidents.47
The arguments on motion show that Mullā Ṣadrā has little utility for catego-
riology or for substance metaphysics as such. The link between his arguments
for motion in substance and modulation in existence is clear: any change and
differentiation in the structure of existence must be predicated on the simple
fact that the essential nature of existence is in flux and differentiation but also
a principle of unity. This goes flatly against the metaphysical pluralism of Avi-
cenna and his Aristotelian substance metaphysics. Ṣadrian monism in a sense
overwhelms all other considerations as these three challenges show. Insisting
upon metaphysical pluralismmotivates most of the Avicennian responses.
2 Mahdī Narāqī
2.1 Life
Muḥammad Mahdī b. Abī Ḏarr Narāqī (d. 1209/1795) was arguably the most
important philosopher of the eighteenth century and a prolific thinker who
engaged critically with the work of Mullā Ṣadrā as well as continuing the Avi-
cennan tradition through his commentaries especially on the Metaphysics of
al-Šifaʾ.48 In particular one might say it was Mullā Ṣadrā’s monism that irked
himmost. Born in Narāq around 1146/1732, he initially studied in Kāšān (where
he later returned to teach), and then trained in Iṣfahān with two thinkers with
a reputation for philosophy. The fact that he studiedwith renowned teachers in
Iṣfahān some twenty years after the Afghan occupation suggests the recovery
of the city’s intellectual milieu and the uninterrupted teaching, transmission
and debate on philosophical arguments from the late Safavid period.
47 Mullā Ṣadrā, Asfār, IV, 457.
48 A recent study is probably thebest introduction tohis philosophy: RezaPourjavady, “Mullā
Mahdī Narāqī,” in Philosophy inQajar Iran, ed. by Pourjavady, 36–65. For his biography, see
Mīrzā Ḥasan Ḥusaynī Zunūzī (d. 1218/1803–4), Riyāḍ al-ǧanna: min al-rawḍa al-rābiʿa, ed.
by ʿAlī Rafīʿī (Qum: Kitābḫāna-yi Āyatullāh Marʿašī Naǧafī, 1370 Š/1991), IV, 567–74; Mīrzā
Muḥammad b. Sulaymān Tunikābunī (d. 1302/1885), Qiṣaṣ al-ʿulamāʾ, ed. by Muḥammad
Riḍā Barzigār Ḫāliqī and ʿIffat Karbāsī (Tehran: Intišārāt-i ʿilmī u farhangī, 1389 Š/2010),
168–70; SayyidḤasan al-Ṣadr (d. 1354/1935),TakmilatAmal al-āmil, ed. byḤusayn ʿAlīMaḥ-
fūẓ, ʿAlī al-Dabbāġ and ʿAdnānal-Dabbāġ (Beirut: Dār al-aḍwāʾ, 1986), V, 492–6;ĀqāBuzurg
Ṭihrānī (d. 1391/1970),Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-Šīʿa, ed. by ʿAlī-NaqīMunzawī (Beirut: Dār iḥyāʾ al-
turāṯ, 2009), XII, 543–4; Ġulām-ḤusaynḪudrī,Taʾmmulī bar sayr-i taṭawwurī-yi ḥukamā va
ḥikmat-imutaʿāliya (Tehran:Muʾassasa-yi pažūhišī-yi ḥikmat u falsafa-yi Īrān, 1391 Š/2012),
319–3; Zādhūš, Dīdār bā fīlsūfān-i Sipāhān, 212–4.
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His teachers in philosophy were primarily two. The first was Muḥammad
Ismāʿīl b. al-Ḥusayn Māzandarānī Ḫwāǧūʾī (d. 1173/1760), who is often invoked
in a lineage that connected the philosophers of Isfahan in the Safavid period
with an establishment of Ṣadrian philosophy in the Qāǧār period, despite the
fact that most of his works are verymuch of a juristic and theological nature.49
On the question of the creation of the cosmos he sided with Mīr Dāmād’s
notion of creation at the mediate level of perpetuity (ḥudūṯ dahrī, albeit on
scripturalist grounds) and not Mullā Ṣadrā in his treatise on the Invalidity of
Imaginary Time (Ibṭāl al-zamān al-mawhūm).50 That text is a direct response
to Ǧamāl al-Dīn Ḫwānsārī’s own defence of imaginary time and critique of
Mīr Dāmād.51 As one manuscript (MS Princeton New Series 749) suggests, it
began life as a gloss on Ḫafrī’s gloss on the ‘new’ Šarḥ al-Taǧrīd. Even his Per-
sian text on existence reflects a critical rejection of monism on scripturalist
grounds (being incompatible with the true teachings of the Qurʾan and the
Imams), rejecting Mullā Ṣadrā’s position on the ontological priority of exis-
tence (without naming him), and asserting that the unity of existence (waḥdat
al-wuǧūd) cannot be philosophically reasoned.52 Most of Ḫwāǧūʾī’s works are
scripturalist and theological in nature, but in one case, a treatise entitled the
Guidance of the Heart to Elements of the States of the Afterlife (Ṯamarat al-fuʾād
ilā nabaḏ min aḥwāl al-maʿād), he defended Mullā Ṣadrā’s eschatology of the
different bodies of the afterlife, created and re-created by the power of the
human soul corresponding to those bodies, as an implicit critique of Avicen-
nism.53 He similarly responded to the standard critique of Mullā Ṣadrā that
accused him of believing in metempsychosis (tanāsuḫ) by another method.54
He did demonstrate his knowledge of the Avicennian tradition, especially the
commentary cycle on the Taǧrīd al-iʿtiqād of al-Ṭūsī, but he tied those discus-
sions closely to ḥadīṯ to elucidate his points. Ḫwāǧūʾī represented a certain
tendency, influenced by Mullā Ṣadrā, that considered the teachings of certain
49 Sayyid Muḥammad Bāqir Mūsawī al-Ḫwānsārī (d. 1313/1895), Rawḍāt al-ǧannāt fī aḥwāl
al-ʿulamāʾ wa-l-sādāt (Beirut: al-Dār al-islāmiyya, 1991), I, 114–9; Mīrzā Muḥammad ʿAlī
Mudarris-i Tabrīzī (d. 1373/1954), Rayḥānat al-adab fī tarāǧim al-maʿrūfīn (Tehran: Čāp-
ḫāna-y Šafaq, 1954), II, 105–6; Āqā Buzurg Ṭihrānī, Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-Šīʿa, IX, 62–4; Ḫudrī,
Taʾmmulī bar sayr-i taṭawwurī-yi ḥukamā va ḥikmat-i mutaʿāliya, 274–81.
50 Ismāʿīl Ḫwāǧūʾī, Ibṭāl al-zamān al-mawhūm, in Ǧalāl al-Dīn Davānī, Sabʿ rasāʾil, ed. by
Sayyid Aḥmad Tūysirkānī (Tehran: Mīrāṯ-i maktūb, 1381 Š/2002), 241–83.
51 Ǧalāl al-Dīn Davānī, Sabʿ rasāʾil, 229–237.
52 Ismāʿīl Ḫwāǧūʾī, Risāla fī waḥdat al-wuǧūd, ed. by Rahīm Qāsimī, inMīrāṯ-i ḥawza-yi Iṣfa-
hān: daftar-i avval (Isfahan: Ustānlarī-yi Iṣfahān, 1383 Š/2004), 138–41.
53 Ḫwāǧūʾī, Ṯamarat al-fuʾād, inMuntaḫabātī, ed. by Āštiyānī, III, 229–306.
54 Ḫwāǧūʾī, Ṯamarat al-fuʾād, inMuntaḫabātī, ed. by Āštiyānī, III, 264–89.
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key ḥadīṯ on ontological and cosmological matters to be entirely homologous
with philosophical doctrines, usually of Neoplatonic provenance. Interestingly,
Mullā Ṣadrā is nowhere mentioned in the text.55 Narāqī referred to Ḫwāǧūʾī as
‘our teacher the verifier’ (ustāḏunā al-muḥaqqiq) in hisǦāmiʿ al-afkār.56 A con-
temporary source quoted him as having either studied or read or taught the
Metaphysics of the Šifāʾ at least thirty times and having memorised the entire
text.57 Another contemporary source remembered him as foremost a philoso-
pher (ḥakīm) and theologian (mutakallim).58 Nevertheless, it is clear that as a
philosopher, his student eclipsed him.
The second teacher was probably Muḥammad Zamān Kāšānī (d. c. 1172/
1759).59 He had iǧāzas from Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ḫātūnābādī (d. 1151/
1739) dated 1147/1734, Mullā ʿAbd al-Raḥīm b. Ǧaʿfar (d. 1154/1741) the grand-
son of Muḥammad Bāqir Sabzawārī who had briefly served as Šayḫ al-Islām of
Iṣfahān under Nādir Šāh (r. 1736–1747), and Mīrzā Muḥammad Bāqir b. ʿAlāʾ al-
Dīn Muḥammad Gulistāna (d. after 1120/1708).60We do not knowmuch about
Kāšānī but some of his philosophical writings have survived. He wrote a gloss
on Ḫwānsārī’s supergloss on Ḫafrī’s gloss on the Šarḥ al-Taǧrīd of Qūšǧī. Other
works of his included treatises in law and a short critique of Sunni traditional-
ist hermeneutics known as the balkafa (‘without asking how’ on the modality
of properties ascribed to God) entitled Guidance of the Righteous and Errors of
Those Who Do not Ask How (Hidāyat al-mustaršidīn wa-taḫṭiʾat al-mubalkafīn)
dated 1166/1753, which, on closer scrutiny, is probably more of a critique of
Ḫwāǧūʾī’s scripturalist approach to theology.61 In hismajorwork entitledMirʾāt
al-zamān dated 1162/1749, he defended the position of the notion of ‘imaginary’
time (al-zamānal-mawhūm), an issue of debate in his time startingwithǦamāl
Ḫwānsārī in the generation before him in his commentary on the Dawānī gloss
55 Ḫwāǧūʾī, Ṯamarat al-fuʾād, inMuntaḫabātī, ed. by Āštiyānī, III, 294–5.
56 Mahdī Narāqī, Ǧāmiʿ al-afkār wa-nāqid al-anẓār, ed. by Maǧīd Hādī-zāda (Tehran: Intišā-
rāt-i ḥikmat, 1381 Š/2002), I, 210.
57 Shaykh ʿAbd al-Nabī al-Qazwīnī (d. c. 1197/1783), Tatmīm Amal al-āmil, ed. Sayyid Aḥmad
al-Ḥusaynī al-Aškiwarī (Qum: Kitābḫāna-yi Āyatullāh Marʿašī Naǧafī, 1986), 67–8.
58 Zunūzī, Riyāḍ al-ǧanna, II, 72–3.
59 Ḫwānsārī, Rawḍāt al-ǧannāt, VII, 119–21; Ḫudrī, Taʾmmulī bar sayr-i taṭawwurī-yi ḥukamā
va ḥikmat-i mutaʿāliya, 269–70; Zādhūš, Dīdār bā fīlsūfān-i Sipāhān, 189–90.
60 Sayyid Mahdī Raǧāʾī, al-Iǧāzāt li-ǧamʿ min al-ʿulamāʾ wa-l-fuqahāʾ wa-l-muḥaddiṯīn (Qum:
Kitābḫāna-yi Āyatullāh Marʿašī Naǧafī, 1386 Š/2008), 19–28; al-Ḥusaynī, Talāmiḏat al-
ʿAllāma al-Maǧlisī, 93; Zādhūš, Dīdār bā fīlsūfān-i Sipāhān, 189; Āqā Buzurg Ṭihrānī,
Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-šīʿa, IX, 94–5, 198–200, 426.
61 Muḥammad ZamānKāšānī,Hidāyat al-mustaršidīnwa-taḫṭiʾat al-mubalkafīn, MSMaǧlis-i
šūrā-yi islāmī Tehran 1966, fols. 17a–32b, completed 1166/1752.
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on the Šarḥ al-taǧrīd of Qūšǧī, and then by his contemporary Ismāʿīl Ḫwāǧūʾī
who criticised it in his Ibṭāl al-zamān al-mawhūm.62
From these teachers, we can deduce that Narāqī had a decent grounding
in Avicennian thought, tinged with influences from Mullā Ṣadrā, and a desire
to connect that study with broadly theological and jurisprudential concerns,
as was often the case in the early modern period in which philosophy was
rarely compartmentalised from other disciplines in the Islamic East. As a poly-
math who wrote on a variety of issues and genres, Narāqī was described by his
student as one who “unifies in himself the rational and the scriptural” (ǧāmiʿ
al-maʿqūl wa-l-manqūl).63
Spending his final years teaching in Kāšān, Narāqī died on 8 Šaʿbān 1209/28
February 1795, according to the biography written by his son Aḥmad in 1227/
1812. His body was transported to Naǧaf and buried near the shrine. There was
no student with a significant standing to take on his legacy, despite the fact
that his philosophical ideas and influences were the most interesting in the
early Qāǧār period (and demonstrated a deep knowledge of the thought of
philosophers who came before). He achieved fame at a time when Kāšān was
flourishing but Iṣfahān had recovered and the centre of culture and power was
gravitating further north. Narāqī represented the culmination of an Avicennan
tradition.While his commentary onal-Šifaʾwas read, it seems a Ṣadrian reading
of Avicenna prevailed. The success of his contemporary ʿAlī Nūrī’s establish-
ment of Mullā Ṣadrā at the heart of the curriculummeant that at least for two
generations Avicennism was eclipsed from the intellectual landscape of Iran
until late in the Qāǧār period; the only Gloss on theMetaphysics of al-Šifāʾ, and
that too a rather brief one on book 1, was written by Mīr Muḥammad Ḥusayn
Ḫātūnābādī who explicitly sought to revive the reading of Ḫwānsārī albeit per-
haps in vain.64 Certainly, that school of Avicenna seemed long gone by the time
of Narāqī’s death.
2.2 Works
Narāqī taught for many years in Kāšān and was a prolific writer including a
series with the title ‘Friend of’ (Anīs) that he wrote in Persian tomake theology
and Šīʿī law comprehensible to themerchant classes. At a time of the increasing
62 Muḥammad Zamān Kāšānī, Mirʾāt al-zamān, ed. by Mahdī Dihbāšī (Tehran: Anǧuman-i
mafāḫir va āṯār-i farhangī, 1384 Š/2005).
63 Muḥammad Ǧaʿfar Kabūdarāhangī “Maǧḏūb ʿAlī Šāh” (d. 1238/1823), Mirʾāt al-ḥaqq, ed.
Ḥāmid Nāǧī Iṣfahānī (Tehran: Intišārāt-i Mawlā, 1383 Š/2004), 70.
64 Mīr Muḥammad Ḥusayn b. ʿAbd al-Bāqī Iṣfahānī Ḫātūnābādī, Ḥāšiyat al-Šifāʾ, MS Marʿašī
Qum 4838, autograph, foll. 1–2.
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dominance of the school of Mullā Ṣadrā, he remained an important Avicen-
nian voice and followed the work and philosophical method of Ṭūsī, writing
a number of studies in astronomy and mathematics including al-Mustaqṣā fī
ʿulūm al-hayʾa, a large and comprehensive text on astronomy in Arabic in four
chapters, Muḥaṣṣal masāʾil al-hayʾa, six chapters on astronomy, Taḥrīr (Per-
sian explanatory translation) of Ṭūsī’s version of the Sphaerics of Theodosius
of Bithynia (d. c. 100BCE), Tawḍīḥ al-iškāl, a Persian translation of Ṭūsī’s work
on Euclid (Taḥrīr Uqlidūs), and some Glosses on the Almagest (al-Maǧisṭī) of
Ptolemy.
In philosophy and theology, hismajor works included the following, starting
with the commentaries on Avicenna and the Avicennian tradition. His com-
mentary on the Metaphysics of al-Šifaʾ of Avicenna covers the most glossed
sections of the first two books (maqāla) ending in chapter 4 of book 2. He
demonstrated an excellent understanding of the Avicennian tradition through
his critical use of the views of Bahmanyār, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Faḫr al-Dīn
al-Rāzī and Quṭb al-Dīn Taḥtānī Rāzī.65 He deployed Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī as a
representative of the Avicennian tradition—just as Mullā Ṣadrā did before—
through his Eastern Discussions (al-Mabāḥiṯ al-mašriqīya); for example, when
he wished to cite an Avicennian authority on the principle that once a thing
becomes non-existent, it cannot return to its prior state (iʿādat al-maʿdūm).66
He also cited the Šīrāzī philosophers, Sayyid Ṣadr al-Dīn (often just named as
al-Sayyid) and Ġiyāṯ al-Dīn (Ġiyāṯ al-ḥukamāʾ) Daštakī, as well as Šams al-Dīn
Ḫafrī; in fact there is a strong sense in which he might be citing their views
via al-Asfār of Mullā Ṣadrā. Often it seems that he adjudicates between the
Ḫwānsārīs and Mullā Ṣadrā preferring the former at times, supporting the lat-
ter as well; this is at times done through a defence of the Šīrāzī philosophers
against Ḫwānsārī (since Mullā Ṣadrā supported the positions of the Šīrāzīs).67
He consistently refers to Mullā Ṣadrā as the Šīrāzī mystic (al-ʿārif al-Šīrāzī).68
Further, he demonstrates his own independence from the Ṣadrian and Avicen-
nian traditions, criticising al-Ṭūsī’s position on explaining the empirical nature
of causality, or Avicenna himself rejecting taqlīd, or claiming at times that
Mullā Ṣadrā failed to understand Avicenna.69
65 Mahdī Narāqī, Šarḥ al-ilāhīyātmin kitāb al-Šifāʾ, ed. by Ḥāmid Nāǧī Iṣfahānī (Qum: Hamā-
yiš-i Mullā Narāqī, 1380 Š/2001), I, 363, 449, 457, 724, 25, 417, 523, 737, 332, 327, 764.
66 Narāqī, Šarḥ al-ilāhīyāt min kitāb al-Šifāʾ, I, 459, citing Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Mabāḥiṯ al-
mašriqīya fī ʿilm al-ilāhīyāt wa-l-ṭabīʿīyāt (Tehran: Maktabat al-Asadī, 1966), I, 47–8.
67 Narāqī, Šarḥ al-ilāhīyāt, I, 764–8.
68 Narāqī, Šarḥ al-ilāhīyāt, I, 147, 151, 165.
69 Mahdī Narāqī, Šarḥ al-ilāhīyāt, I, 63, II, 809, I, 154, 194.
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His other major philosophical commentary was Compendium of Thoughts
and Critique of Opinions (Ǧāmiʿ al-afkar wa-nāqid al-anẓār), completed in
Kāšān in Rabīʿ I 1193/1779, on the proofs for the existence of God and Avicen-
nian metaphysics. Although it appears to be an independent treatise that is
incomplete, it is in effect a gloss on the commentary cycle of Taǧrīdal-iʿtiqād. In
Qurrat al-ʿuyūn completed in 1182/1768, Narāqī said that he wrote Ǧāmiʿ on the
commentary cycle on Avicenna’s al-Išarat wa-l-tanbīhāt.70 This suggests that
theǦāmiʿwas probably commencedmore than a decade before its completion
date. Although the cycle of al-Išārāt is mentioned often (but not as frequently
as theMetaphysics of al-Šifāʾ), he stated in the introduction that he would dis-
cuss the nature of God and his attributes following the commentaries on the
‘New Commentary’ (šarḥ ǧadīd) on the Taǧrīd al-iʿtiqād by ʿAlī al-Qūšǧī.71 As
wementioned above, the third section (al-maqṣad al-ṯāliṯ) of theTaǧrīd on the
proof for the existence of a creator (iṯbāt al-ṣāniʿ) was a much glossed text that
reflected the Avicennian tradition; most of the Safavid and later glosses built
upon the one byḪafrī who focused his analysis on the three attributes of power
(which includeshowGodcreates and the relationbetweenGodand the cosmos
or the eternal and themutable), knowledge, and speech, along with an Avicen-
nian proof for divine simplicity.72 Nārāqī followed these emphases: his work is
divided into three sections (abwāb)—the first two on kataphatic affirmations
of God’s power and knowledge, and the third on apophatic denials of whatGod
is not that follows the analysis of divine simplicity. These are prefaced by the
long discussion on establishing the existence of God which examines some of
the key assumptions in the Avicennian argument: the impossibility of an infi-
nite regress, the nature of causality, the process of preponderance whereby a
cause brings into existence something that was previously indifferent to exis-
tence and non-existence, and the differentways inwhich philosophers, theolo-
gians and Sufis demonstrate the existence of God.73 If one keeps in mind the
typology of arguments that are mentioned by al-Ṭūsī in his Šarḥ al-išārāt, then
the naturalistic argument frommotion is missing.74
He wrote a few independent treatises. Cooling of the Eyes (Qurrat al-ʿuyūn),
a treatise on existence and essence that attracted the critical attention of ʿAlī
70 Mahdī Narāqī,Qurrat al-ʿuyūn fī-l-wuǧūdwa-l-māhīya, ed. by Ḥasan al-ʿUbaydī (Beirut: al-
Maḥaǧǧa al-bayḍāʾ, 2009), 54.
71 Narāqī, Ǧāmiʿ al-afkār, I, 1.
72 Ḫafrī, Taʿlīqa bar Ilāhīyāt, 99–155, 169–99, 207–19.
73 Narāqī,Ǧāmiʿ al-afkār, I, 4–148; see also Firouzeh Saatchian,GottesWesen—GottesWirken:
Ontologie und Kosmologie imDenken von Šams al-DīnMuḥammad al-Ḫafrī (gest. 942/1535)
(Berlin: Franz Schwarz Verlag, 2011), 128–96.
74 Ibn Sīnā, al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt, III, 66–7.
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Nūrī and Shaykh Aḥmad al-Ahsāʾī, was completed in Rabīʿ II, 1182/1768 and in
some ways acts as a companion work to Ǧāmiʿ al-afkār.75 There are fourteen
discussions ranging from the ontological priority of existence and themodula-
tion of existence to how it is existence that is emanated from God, but it also
contains an important critique of the views of Dawānī on existence (section
twelve) and a refutation of the monist doctrine of the unity of existence (waḥ-
dat al-wuǧūd) in section thirteen.76 It is precisely those last few chapters on
the unity of existence that mark out the distinction of this treatise, and they
constitute the longest section of the text. His critique actually drew on Mullā
Ṣadrā’s criticism of the position of Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī (d. 673/1274) via that of
ʿAlāʾ al-Dawla al-Simnānī (d. 736/1336), and he provided seven ways of making
sense or ‘correcting’ the concept of the unity of existence.
He also has a trilogy of texts inArabic in descending complexity of argument
and length of discussion that all begin with an ontological preliminary on the
nature of existence and essence. The first is Flashes from the Divine Empyrean
(al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya).77 In the introduction he announced five sections: on
existence and essences (general ontology), on the attributes of God and divine
agency, on the nature of his creation and the emanation of the cosmos, on the
nature of the human soul and its activities, and on prophecy and resurrection.
However, the text seems incomplete as it finishes with the discussion on Mīr
Dāmād’s notion of perpetual creation at the end of section three. The second
sectionoverlapswith elements of Ǧāmiʿ al-afkār and the first section is hismost
detailed exposition of his general ontology where the broad influence of Mullā
Ṣadrā’s tripartite doctrine of the ontological priority of existence, its modula-
tion and its emanation is clear (aṣālat al-wuǧūd, taškīk al-wuǧūd andmaǧʿūlīyat
al-wuǧūd).
Then its epitome is Divine Flash on Transcendental Philosophy (al-Lumʿa al-
ilahīya fi-l-ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya) on the Ṣadrian tradition.78 It is divided into
five sections (bāb) with each further divided into flashes (lumʿa): existence and
essence (including the Ṣadrian arguments for the ontological priority andmod-
ulation of existence and the chain of existence as the direct creation of God);
proof for the existence of God (following the Avicennian model of the Nec-
75 The newer edition by al-ʿUbaydī includes the glosses on Bīdābādī responding on the ques-
tion of monism—see Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 263–73.
76 Mahdī Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, ed. by Sayyid Ǧalāl al-Dīn Āštiyānī (Tehran: Institute of
Philosophy, 1978), 138–60, 161–235.
77 Mahdī Narāqī, al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya, ed. by ʿAlī Awǧabī (Tehran: Intišārāt-i kitābḫāna,
mūza va markaz-i asnād-i Maǧlis-i Šūrā-yi islāmī, 1381 Š/2002).
78 Mahdī Narāqī, al-Lumʿa al-ilāhīya wa-l-kalimāt al-waǧīza, ed. by Sayyid Ǧalāl al-Dīn Āšti-
yānī (Tehran: Institute of Philosophy, 1978), 51–129.
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essary existence) and his properties, especially knowledge, power and speech;
emanation and cosmogony including the Ṣadrian notion of nobler possibility
(imkān ašraf ), Platonic forms and the nature of the creation of the cosmos
(ḥudūṯ al-ʿālam); the nature of the soul and its lives, including a refutation
of metempsychosis, and affirmation of the ontological status of the realm of
similitudes (ʿālam al-miṯāl); and prophecy and his mission (but there is no dis-
cussion of the imamate).
Finally, the shortest version is its epitome Pithy Words (al-Kalimāt al-waǧī-
za),79 which is divided into six sections: existence and properties of essence,
including a discussion of the nature of creation, on individuation, on the anal-
ogy of existence and the different considerations (iʿtibārāt) of essence; on the
existence of God, his knowledge, agency and speech; on emanation and cos-
mogony, including the nature of the creation of the cosmos and how the argu-
ment of Mīr Dāmād is better than either the notion of imaginary time (al-
zamān al-mawhūm) or the Sadrian notion of motion in substance;80 on the
nature of the soul and refutation of metempsychosis; on prophecy; and on the
imamate and its rational incumbency based on the principle of divine facilitat-
ing grace (luṭf ).
2.3 Thought
Narāqī was a thoughtful critic of Mullā Ṣadrā, following him on some issues
and not on others. For example, a question that was of debate in the Safavid
period following the philosophers of Šīrāz was the consideration of the God-
world relationship through the existence-essence distinction that pertained to
contingents in the Avicennian tradition. Narāqī sided withMullā Ṣadrā on two
related points here: when considering contingent beings which were concep-
tual composites of existence and essence, it was the former that was ontologi-
cally prior, the Ṣadrian doctrine known as the ontological priority of existence
(aṣālat al-wuǧūd); concomitantly therefore, what is produced by God is exis-
tence and not essence (maǧʿūlīyat al-wuǧūd).81 The ultimate referent for exis-
tence, on the basis of which we have a derivative concept of existence and
which we then apply to contingents, is God insofar as he is a simple reality
(ḥaqīqa basīṭa) devoid of an essence (muǧarrad ʿan al-māhīya).82 The mind
then analyses the two aspects of each contingent as its existence (the deriva-
79 Narāqī, al-Lumʿa al-ilāhīya, 133–55.
80 Narāqī, al-Lumʿa al-ilāhīya, 148.
81 Narāqī, Ǧāmiʿ al-afkār, I, 439; idem, al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya, 19–22; idem, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 57–
60.
82 Narāqī, al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya, 5.
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tive concept of it) and its essence, holding them to be mentally and concep-
tually distinct.83 He seems to hold that the conceptual distinction of essence
and existence in the phenomenal world does not map onto reality; like Mulla
Sadra, he does not think that essences exist in extramental reality.84 If it were
essences that were ontologically prior, that would entail an infinite regress of
non-existent things and nothing would exist.85 Essences insofar as they are
universals do not exist in re and that by which something is what it is in its
individuation is due to existence and not essence.86 Concomitantly, he holds
that the different existents are related to one another through the semantics of
modulation; existence is said of in many ways arranged in a modulated man-
ner (mušakkaka).87 On a related issue of ontology, he agrees withMullā Ṣadrā’s
presentationof nobler possibilitywhich is themanner inwhich causalityworks
in the hierarchy of existence whereby the nobler causes what is lesser, and the
lesser desires the nobler; this is ultimately a proof for the intelligible realm and
the hierarchical nature of emanation.88 Yet, he recognises, like others before
him from the Avicennian tradition that Mullā Ṣadrā was not an ‘orthodox’
adherent of Avicennism, and he consistently refers to him as the Shirazimystic
(al-ʿārif al-šīrāzī).89 One further point on which he differs with Avicenna and
broadly agrees at one level with Mullā Ṣadrā is in his affirmation of the reality
of Platonic forms drawing upon Suhrawardī as well as the Theology of Aristotle,
thus in a sense defending what he considers to be ‘orthodox’ Aristotelianism
against Avicenna.90
He upheld the Sadrian infallibilist position on epistemology, which is based
on the identity thesis (ittiḥād al-ʿāqil wa-l-maʿqūl) and ‘knowledge by presence’
(ʿilm ḥuḍūrī).91 Consistent with Mulla Sadra and other thinkers of a broadly
Platonist persuasion in the Safavid period, but contrary to Avicenna, he affirms
the existence of an ontological realm known as the ‘world of images’ (ʿālam
al-miṯāl).92
Nevertheless, he is critical of a number of Ṣadrian positions. First, while
he adopted the notion of modulation in existence (taškīk al-wuǧūd), follow-
83 Narāqī, al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya, 8–9.
84 Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 54–8.
85 Narāqī, al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya, 6.
86 Narāqī, al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya, 9.
87 Narāqī, al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya, 23.
88 Narāqī, al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya, 403–13.
89 Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 109, 121, 178, 190, 196, 197, 201.
90 Narāqī, al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya, 446–55; Mullā Ṣadrā, Asfār, VI, 178–228.
91 Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 76–8; Narāqī, al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya, 12–4.
92 Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 111–5.
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ing Ṭūsī, he considered it to be merely a logical concept and not something
that pertains to actuality, nor is it something which is essential to the reality
of existence, and in fact in doing so he might be reflecting a more ‘orthodox’
Avicennism stemming fromNaṣīr al-DīnṬūsī.93 He explicitly ruled out the pos-
sibility of a singular butmodulated reality of existence, not least because of his
opposition to ontological monism.94
Second, his most important disagreement lies in the issue of the hypostatic
unity of existence. While accepting the possibility of a mystical intuition for
the unity of existence (waḥdat al-wuǧūd), he does not think it can be rationally
demonstrated or known.95 He asserts that the Sufi contention that God is abso-
lute existence (wuǧūdmuṭlaq) and that existence is something singular, simple
and undifferentiated (amr basīṭ šaḫṣī) both violate our common sense obser-
vations (mušāhada), intellect (ʿaql) and intuition that, in actuality, there is a
multiplicity of existents in reality.96 This is, as he says, despite the fact that “all
great Sufis” agree that the intellect should decide such matters.
But it is not just the simple notion of the unity of existence that is undiffer-
entiated and that seems to come from Qūnawī that he criticises. He critiqued
Mullā Ṣadrā’s version of monism aswell as Ibn ʿArabī’s—that is themain thrust
of his treatise the Cooling of the Eyes. He argues concomitantly that the issue
of the simple reality being all things (basīṭ al-haqīqa kullu l-ašyāʾ) is not estab-
lished.97 He did not approve of the extension of Avicenna’s point about divine
simplicity in a monist direction. It seems that his own sympathies lay with a
metaphysical exposition that is a more Avicennian version of Mulla Ṣadrā. To
critique the point, he posited the following argument. Consider the concept of
Zayd and the concomitant concepts that wemay have—that Zayd is a human,
that he is a writer and that he is not a horse. All of these cannot be at the
same level united as one, because the law of the excluded middle does not
allow for Zayd to be some existence (a writer) and some non-existence (not-
horse) at the same time.98 With Avicenna, he affirms the actual plurality of
contingent existents.99 He cited previous critics of Mullā Ṣadrā on the issue of
unity, drawing upon Ḫwānsārī and Muḥammad Tunikābunī known as Fāżil-i
93 Narāqī, al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya, 22–5; idem,Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 65–70; idem, al-Lumʿa al-ilāhīya,
79; idem, Šarḥ al-ilāhīyāt, I, 426–9.
94 Narāqī, al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya, 30–1.
95 Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 218–21; idem, Ǧāmiʿ al-afkār, I, 138–41.
96 Narāqī, Ǧāmiʿ al-afkār, I, 139–41.
97 Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 205.
98 Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 202.
99 Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 115–20.
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Sarāb (d. 1124/1713); he also cited Ḫwānsārī’s contention that the Sadrian posi-
tion reflects the dominance of poetic language over rational content.100 And
in an implicit critique of the Ṣadrian equation of knowledge and existence, he
contended that the fallacy of the unity of existence reverts to the conflation of
ontology and epistemology.101
Narāqī suggested that Mullā Ṣadrā has been misled by Ḫafrī and quoted in
detail the latter’s position that only God exists and everything else is merely
a mental conceptualisation that we have from the conceptualisation of God’s
existence; and thatGod is hidden and contingents are themanifest, but in actu-
ality they are indistinct since the hidden and manifest are aspects of the same
thing.102 Narāqī cannot accept such dissolution of the ontological distinction
between the creator and the created. He summarises the position in the follow-
ing manner:
The doctrine of the Sufis and explicit sayings of many recent scholars
is that existence and the existent are one but that this singular exis-
tence is taken in different considerations whereby the levels of that exis-
tence are only considerations posited in the mind because reality across
all levels is one. The mentally posited distinction is sometimes nega-
tively conditioned (bi-šarṭ lā-šayʾ), sometimes unconditioned (lā bi-šarṭ)
and sometimes conditioned (bi-šarṭ šayʾ) due to the descent of exis-
tence from the highest level to the remainder. […] Contingent existences
are conceptualisations in the mind, manifestations and disclosures of
the Real existence and rays of his light and shadows of his illumina-
tion.103
Part of the problem for Narāqī is Mullā Ṣadrā’s claim that he knows this on
the basis of a mystical intuition and not on the basis of rational proof; and the
fact that he uses poetical language by describing contingents as mirrors of the
divine.104 But more significantly, although Ṣadrā does not say so explicitly, in
effect the Sufi position of unity makes the totality of existence into an essence
that can be conditioned in three ways and seems to point towards the onto-
100 Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 234–5.
101 Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 217.
102 Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 181–3; Ḫafrī, Sitt rasāʾil fī iṯbāt wāǧib al-wuǧūd bi-l-ḏāt wa fī l-
ilāhīyāt, ed. by Firūza Sāʿatčīyān (Tehran: Intišārāt-i kitābḫāna, mūza va markaz-i asnād-i
Maǧlis-i Šūrā-yi islāmī, 1390 Š/2011), 152–3.
103 Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 185–7.
104 Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 190.
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logical priority of essence (aṣālat al-māhīya). Furthermore, it conflates two
possible senses of ‘absolute existence,’ the former being a concept abstracted
from one’s observation of contingent essences and the other being the actual
pure existence of the divine.105 This is one of the reasonswhy he rejectedMullā
Ṣadrā’s appropriation of the modalities of essence for an analysis of existence.
Mullā Ṣadrā takes the three considerations of essence (lā bi-šarṭ, bi-šarṭ lā šayʾ,
bi-šarṭ šayʾ) from the Metaphysics of al-Šifāʾ and applies them to the three
ways in which to consider existence while retaining its unity, and which he
calls absolute (muṭlaq), delimited (muqayyad) and deployed existence (munb-
asiṭ).106 Narāqī summarised his objection:
As for these three levels of existence, I mean reality taken negatively con-
ditioned, reality unconditioned and reality with a condition, either they
must be distinct in actuality ( fī l-wāqiʿ) and the fact itself (nafs al-amr)
or they must be distinct simply in the mind and in consideration. If it
is the former, then unity of existence is not realised because the exis-
tence of the Necessary is one thing, and the existence of contingents
another. And that third mode of existence—existence deployed (munb-
asiṭ) is another thing again. But none of the Sufis claim this nor does the
mystic [Mullā Ṣadrā] claim so as is clear in the passages presented. If it
is the latter, as seems to be explicit in the writings of Sufis and resem-
bles what is quoted above from the mystic [Mullā Ṣadrā], then there is
no distinction between these levels in actuality but only in mental con-
sideration, and thus one could apply Real existence to the first level or
to the second or any, and how can one grasp one thing from these differ-
ences?107
The problem is that Sufis—and he cites Ibn ʿArabī as well as Mullā Ṣadrā’s
approval—sometimes use unconditioned reality of existence and sometimes
negatively conditioned reality of existence to apply to God. This reverts to
the old problem of the conflation of two senses of absolute existence men-
tioned.
Third, on the incipience of the soul, Narāqī rejects the Sadrian doctrine that
the soul is corporeal in its incipience and argues for its spiritual incipience
(rūḥanīyat al-ḥudūṯ) consistent with the Avicennian tradition.108 In fact, the
105 Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 172.
106 Ibn Sīnā, al-Šifāʾ: al-ilāhīyāt, I, 213–9; Mullā Ṣadrā, Asfār, II, 15–6, II, 330–2, 346–7.
107 Narāqī, Qurrat al-ʿuyūn, 175–8.
108 Narāqī, al-Lumʿa al-ilāhīya, 96–101.
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radical distinction between body and the soul and the fact that the soul does
not become corrupted or non-existent with the corruption of the body means
that its origins and its final state are non-material and non-corporeal in real-
ity. Part of the reason is that one thing cannot become another—and Narāqī
rejected motion in substance.109
Furthermore, on the question of the incipience of the cosmos, he sets aside
Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory of motion in substance as ameans for reconciling an eter-
nal cosmos with God’s creative agency, and opts instead, following his teacher
Ḫwaǧūʾī, for Mīr Dāmād’s notion of perpetual creation (ḥudūṯ dahrī).110 In the
Flashes from the Divine Empyrean, he begins by setting out three positions: the
philosophers hold that the cosmos is posterior to God in a purely logical sense
insofar as it is preceded only by the very essence of God; the theologians hold
that the cosmos is posterior to God in time and hence it is preceded by non-
existence in time; and the third is a recent position—and he means that of
Mīr Dāmād—that the cosmos begins in perpetuity (dahr) so that it is properly
preceded by non-existence and there is a separation (infikāk) from the divine
essence.111 He deals with various objections to the theory of Mīr Dāmad. Con-
sider the following two. First, the divine essence insofar as it is a perfect cause
is sufficient for the cosmos; positing any separation either by time or by per-
petuity would violate the notion of the perfect cause. Second, God is the most
perfect thing that can be conceived and therefore it would not be appropri-
ate to consider when divine agency and causation began and when it ended.
In both cases, positing a separation between God and the cosmos is consid-
ered to be a postulation of deficiency in God. Narāqī responds by saying that
the separation defends the contingency of the cosmos since it is precisely that
contingency which constitutes a relative deficiency. It is therefore not the per-
fection of God that is at stake but ensuring the contingency of the cosmos.112
Finally, in his summary of why this is the best way to understand the incip-
ience of the cosmos, he appeals to the authority of the Theology of Aristotle:
the foundations and pillars of the cosmos, such as the celestial spheres and
the elements, do not exist in time (zamān), rather they exist in perpetuity
(dahr).113
109 Narāqī, Šarḥ al-ilāhīyāt, II, 730–754.
110 Narāqī, Ǧāmiʿ al-afkār, I, 178–243; idem, Šarḥ al-ilāhīyāt, 92–5.
111 Narāqī, al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya, 468–9.
112 Narāqī, al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya, 470–1.
113 Narāqī, al-Lamaʿāt al-ʿaršīya, 484.
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3 Conclusion
Narāqī represented a developed and transformedAvicennismandprovides fur-
ther evidence for the dossier of how commentatorial traditions do not simply
defenddoctrines but developed them indynamicways. Narāqī sawMullā Ṣadrā
as a reasonable reader of Avicenna but he was critical of some key issues, not
least of metaphysical monism, returning to the text of Avicenna and his ear-
lier commentators. Significantly, he perpetuated the reading of Avicenna on
creation that considered Mīr Dāmād’s solution of creation at the level of per-
petuity to be the most reasonable understanding of Avicenna’s insistence on
the contingency and necessity of the cosmos as well as the denial of the the-
ological doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in time. Nevertheless, Narāqī represented
in some ways the last moment of the significance of the Avicennian tradition
as it was being replaced by Mullā Ṣadrā. In later generations, the critiques of
Mullā Ṣadrā were broadly ignored by the mainstream of the seminarian study
of philosophy and even in the philosophy departments of the Iranian univer-
sities. Similarly, when one looks at the works of contemporary Avicennians
such as Yaḥyā Yaṯribī or those editing and writing on the Avicennian tradition
such as Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, it is clear that they have been extensively influenced
by the Sadrian tradition—and this was already clear in the work of Narāqī.
The case study of the thought of Mahdī Narāqī shows how Avicennisms were
constantly in the process of changing and shifting—and it demonstrates one
of the key insights of the late Pierre Hadot about how the history of philos-
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